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THE NEED FOR CONDITIONS LIMITING THE USE
OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: LESSONS FROM THE
BRITISH COURTS
SYLVIA COSTELLOE*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Place of Legislative History Within the Debate
on Statutory Interpretation
Statutory interpretation is of crucial importance for both lawyers
and judges.1  A notably fertile source of debate is the use of legislative
history for purposes of statutory interpretation, which gained particular
momentum in the past century.2  Proponents of the use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation argue that it is a valuable tool for
interpreting ambiguous statutes.3  On the other hand, opponents such
as Justice Scalia have argued that the only law that should govern is that
which has been passed by a majority of the House and the Senate.4  The
debate among American judges and scholars has largely centered
around whether or not the courts should be allowed recourse to the
legislative record at all,5 though it has been suggested that we develop a
more nuanced approach to the issue.6  In order to foster debate sur-
* J.D., Notre Dame Law School. The author would like to thank Professor Anthony
J. Bellia for his helpful comments on this Note.
1. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
14 (Amy Gutmann et al. eds., 6th ed. 1998) (noting that “[T]he subject of statutory inter-
pretation deserves study and attention in its own right, as the principal business of judges
and (hence) lawyers.”).
2. Id. at 30.
3. See James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation”, 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 889
(1930) (“Legislative history similarly affords in many instances accurate and compelling
guides to legislative meaning.  Successive drafts of the same act do not simply succeed
each other as isolated phenomena, but the substitution of one for another necessarily
involves an element of choice often leaving little doubt as to the reasons governing such a
choice.”).
4. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1844)) (emphasis omitted) (“We are gov-
erned by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. . . . ‘The law as it passed is the will of the
majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act
itself.’”).
5. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 29–30 (“My view that the objective indication of the
words, rather than the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of
course, to the conclusion that legislative history should not be used as an authoritative
indication of a statute’s meaning.”).
6. James J. Brudney, Below The Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by the House
of Lords and the Supreme Court, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 71 (2007) (arguing that we should
become “more attentive to the nuances of positive reliance on legislative history, rather
than simply continuing to debate the merits of its wholesale exclusion”).
299
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rounding the use of legislative history, it is instructive to look to the
experience in other common law countries.  This Note will focus on the
experience of British courts and their use of legislative history, using
the House of Lords case Pepper v. Hart7 as a focal point.
B. The Need for Conditions Limiting Recourse to Legislative History
This Note will argue that American courts should be guided by
conditions limiting when recourse to legislative history may be had.  In
order to make that argument, this Note will proceed in the following
way:  first, Section II will discuss the value of a comparative approach to
the use of legislative history.  It will then discuss in Section III the argu-
ments that have been made in favor and against considering legislative
history for purposes of statutory interpretation, making particular note
of the constitutional objections.  Section IV will consider whether it is
possible to draw any principles regarding the place of legislative history
from recent Supreme Court case law.  A model for laying down limiting
conditions in this area will be discussed in Section V through the exam-
ple of the British case, Pepper v. Hart.  The section will also consider the
criticisms leveled against the case and the impact that it has had on
subsequent cases.  The final section will consider why the conditions in
Pepper would be unworkable in American courts, and what concerns
would have to be addressed in laying down conditions regarding the
use of legislative history in the American context.  This Note will con-
clude by addressing the areas in which future research would be
required, namely whether it would be possible for Congress to lay down
limiting conditions that address all the concerns regarding use of legis-
lative history, and whether such conditions could also be binding on
state courts.
II. A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
This section will address the value of a comparative approach to
the use of legislative history for statutory interpretation.  It will briefly
outline the development regarding the use of legislative history in Brit-
ish courts prior and after Pepper v. Hart.  It will consider the differences
between the British and American lawmaking process and how these
differences might affect the value of the comparative analysis.  Finally, it
will show how the experience in British courts reveals that there are
three possible approaches to the issue of legislative history—prohibit-
ing such consultation altogether (as was the case in British courts
before Pepper), allowing unfettered consultation, or allowing consulta-
tion subject to certain limiting conditions (as is the practice of British
courts after Pepper). The object of this Note is to demonstrate why it is
desirable to lay down limiting conditions, even though the precise con-
ditions laid down in Pepper would not be workable in American courts.
7. Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593 (H.L.).
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A. The Exclusionary Rule
Unlike American courts, which never adopted an explicit rule
allowing or disallowing use of legislative history in statutory interpreta-
tion, the British courts were long governed by a strict exclusionary rule.
This rule prohibited British judges from consulting legislative history
for purposes of statutory interpretation.8  It was significantly relaxed in
the 1992 House of Lords case Pepper v. Hart, where Lord Browne-Wil-
kinson determined that consideration of legislative history should be
allowed, provided three conditions were met: “(a) legislation is ambigu-
ous or obscure, or leads to an absurdity; (b) the material relied upon
consists of one or more statements by a Minister or other promoter of
the Bill together if necessary with such other Parliamentary material as
is necessary to understand such statements and their effect; (c) the
statements relied upon are clear.”9  The decision to relax the exclusion-
ary rule is thus a relatively recent one in British jurisprudence.  This is a
primary reason why consideration of the British approach is instructive
for American courts.  An examination of cases decided in the years
since Pepper reveals that if legislative history is to be consulted at all, it is
desirable to set limitations on when such recourse may be had.  The
value of Pepper and subsequent cases for purposes of this Note lies in the
fact that it provides a model of how consultation of legislative history
might be strictly circumscribed.  The object of the limitations in Pepper
is to limit the amount and type of legislative history that may be con-
sulted, and to signal to lawyers how much work they should put into
examining the legislative history of any given statute in order to put the
best case forward for their clients.  In Section V, this Note will consider
the criticism of Pepper and the effect that the decision had on subse-
quent British cases.
B. Differences Between the British and American Lawmaking Process
A comparative analysis requires an examination of the differences
between the British and American lawmaking processes.  These differ-
ences have an effect on how courts in the respective countries approach
statutory interpretation and elements of legislative history.  Though
these differences are not insignificant, we can nonetheless use the Brit-
ish courts’ approach as a model for a more restrictive use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation.
The British structure of government is characterized by the party-
controlled parliamentary system, which results in the executive having
significant influence over the statutes passed in Parliament.10  The Brit-
ish Parliament consists of three elements—the House of Commons
(with approximately 650 elected members), the House of Lords (with
approximately 800 unelected members) and the monarch.11  As the
8. Nicholas M. McLean, Comment, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation in Transna-
tional Litigation, 122 YALE L.J. 303, 309 (2012).
9. [1993] A.C. at 640.
10. GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 40 (13th ed. 2012).
11. Id. at 82.
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only democratically elected body, the House of Commons is the ulti-
mate location of power.12  Most notably, the government is drawn from
the majority governing the House of Commons.13  The result of this
party-controlled parliamentary regime is that it is questionable whether
a clear demarcation between the executive and the legislature is possi-
ble.14  The most important consequence of this system of government is
that the executive, which dominates Parliament, can essentially deter-
mine which policies it wishes to implement in Parliament.15  Prior to
2005 the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords acted as the final
court of appeal.  The Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 abolished the
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and created an entirely
separate Supreme Court.
In order for a proposed bill to become an enacted statute, it must
pass through and be approved by both Houses of Parliament and
receive Royal Assent.16  A bill introduced in the House of Commons
goes through two readings before being considered by a standing com-
mittee, which considers the bill clause by clause, and may make amend-
ments.17  The bill is then reported back to the House of Commons, to
enable consideration of any amendments made by the standing com-
mittee, and to allow for further debates to take place at a third read-
ing.18  The standing committee reports play only a peripheral role in
creating and explaining bill language.19  A further consequence of Brit-
ain’s party-controlled parliamentary system is that the legislative text is
rarely changed after introduction.  As a result, there might be less of a
need to consult Hansard (the official record of standing committee
proceedings and parliamentary debates) to explain the legislative
text.20
The status of standing committee reports in British legislative his-
tory stands in contrast to the committee report in Congress, which is
considered a primary source of reliable legislative history in the Ameri-
can context.21  American legislative history includes a diverse set of
materials, generated at different stages by Congress and its commit-
tees.22  In further contrast to the United Kingdom, the American struc-
ture of government provides for a clear demarcation between the
executive, legislature, and judiciary.23  The Constitution provides that
in order for a bill to become law, it must pass through the House and
the Senate and receive the President’s assent.24  Legislation is often a
12. Id.
13. Id. at 38.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 80.
16. Id. at 86–87.
17. Id. at 82–83.
18. Id. at 83.
19. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 4.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 4–5.
23. U.S. CONST. arts. I–III.
24. The Constitution states that,
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE110.txt unknown Seq: 5 20-APR-15 10:45
2015] NEED FOR CONDITIONS LIMITING USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 303
product of compromise in Congress, and the Supreme Court often
refers to legislative history to understand those bargains.25
Despite these differences, however, there is much to be gained
from looking at the British approach to statutory interpretation.  While
the line between the executive and legislature is somewhat blurred in
the British system, the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 made the
judiciary wholly separate, tasked with interpreting the law just as Ameri-
can judges are.  Though the amount of legislative history that British
judges can rely on is more limited, it nevertheless constitutes valuable
interpretive material that has not gone through the legislative process.
Finally, a look at the British approach is most instructive because the
British courts’ relatively recent relaxation of the exclusionary rule is a
model for how the adoption of conditions regarding the use of legisla-
tive history may affect how courts treat legislative history in statutory
interpretation.
C. Three Possibilities for Dealing with Legislative History
The experience in Britain reveals three possibilities for deciding
whether or not to consult legislative history for purposes of statutory
interpretation. First, one could maintain the current status quo in
American courts, which is to allow unfettered consultation of legislative
history depending on the individual judge’s discretion.  Second, one
might allow consultation of legislative history provided that certain con-
ditions have been met.  This is the approach taken by the British courts
following Pepper v. Hart.  Third, one could ban consultation of legisla-
tive history altogether.  This was the approach taken by the British
courts prior to Pepper v. Hart.  An examination of past and current
American case law reveals that the current status quo in American
courts is undesirable because it creates uncertainty for litigants, who
will not know beforehand whether or not the interpretation of the stat-
ute at issue will be influenced by legislative history.  At the other end of
the spectrum, experience in American courts and the reasons given in
Pepper for relaxation of the exclusionary rule in Britain show that it is
Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objec-
tions to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objec-
tions at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be
sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise
be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a
Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas
and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be
entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be
returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have
been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which
Case it shall not be a Law.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
25. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 5.
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unrealistic to forbid a court to consult legislative history when faced
with an ambiguous statute.  This leaves the approach adopted in Pepper
as the most workable one, laying down strict limitations on when legisla-
tive history may be consulted.  An examination of the conditions laid
down in Pepper reveals that while conditions are desirable, the ones laid
down in Pepper would be unworkable in the American context.  Such
limiting conditions would probably have to be laid down by Congress,
instead of the Supreme Court.  The next section will consider argu-
ments in favor and against consulting legislative history for purposes of
statutory interpretation.
III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR AND AGAINST CONSULTING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The decision whether or not to consult legislative history in Ameri-
can courts has largely been a matter of the discretion of individual
judges, though such consultation only really picked up in the last cen-
tury.  According to Justice Scalia, it was not until the 1940s that courts
began to extensively use legislative history in statutory interpretation.26
Since there has never been a definitive case determining whether
or not use of legislative history in American courts should be allowed,
the debate in U.S. courts has centered mainly around whether or not
legislative history should be consulted in the first place.27  This section
will consider an initial question, namely whether there are strong argu-
ments in favor of consulting legislative history at all.  It will also address
the constitutional concerns regarding the use of legislative history.
A. Is There Any Value in Considering Legislative History When Interpreting
a Statute?
Legislative history is often a valuable tool for statutory interpreta-
tion.  Many statutes are ambiguous on their face and require some aid
in interpretation.  There are many reasons why a statute may be
unclear—notably, ambiguities might allow legislators to make different
claims to different constituents.28  Another reason might be the need
for a statute to respond to changing times.29  As Saul Levmore notes,
“[a]mbiguity can be intentional or unintentional; it can derive from
misunderstandings about language, from simple mistakes, from a fail-
ure to plan ahead, or from the impossibility of seeing very far ahead.”30
All these reasons suggest that it will often be the case that a statute is
found to be ambiguous.
In light of the many reasons why a statute may be intentionally or
unintentionally found ambiguous, there may be many instances in
26. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 30.
27. Brudney, supra note 6, at 60 (“[R]ecent debate[s] on the Supreme Court
between legislative history advocates and skeptics [have] generally been cast in an all-or-
nothing form.”).
28. Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1082 (2010).
29. Id. at 1083.
30. Id. at 1077.
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which a court might find it useful to consult legislative history for pur-
poses of interpretation.  The strongest case in favor of consulting legis-
lative history is the situation where the meaning of a statute was
elaborated in legislative proceedings but the legislature had failed to
make this meaning clear in the enacted text.  Arguably, consulting legis-
lative history in such situations would allow for the courts to give effect
to Congress’s true intent.  In particular, there may be a statement in a
statute’s legislative history that addresses the particular issue faced by
the court in a given case.  If it could be discerned that this statement
exhibited Congress’s true intent, then it would seem unobjectionable to
refer to this statement for purposes of interpreting the statute.  If legis-
lative history is considered one of many tools of statutory interpretation,
just as purposivist, textualist, and intentionalist approaches are consid-
ered valuable tools, then it is hard to object to its use as one of a num-
ber of tools of statutory interpretation.  Opponents, however, would
argue that there is a great risk in giving a particular statement of legisla-
tive history authoritative value, allowing it to trump the enacted statu-
tory text and other methods of statutory interpretation.
B. Objections to Use of Legislative History
The objections to use of legislative history are best illustrated by
the Supreme Court case of Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States,31
which has often been cited as proof of the questionable consequences
that consultation of legislative history might have.  The case involved
the interpretation of the Alien Contract Labor Act, which forbade the
“importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or for-
eigners, into the United States . . . under contract or agreement . . .
made previous to the importation or migration of such alien or aliens,
foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in the
United States . . . .”32
In reaching the conclusion that the Alien Contract Labor Act did
not cover the minister who had been hired by the Church of the Holy
Trinity, Justice Brewer referred to the title of the act, the evil which the
act intended to remedy, as well as committee reports.  The case is per-
haps most famous for Justice Brewer’s suggestion of “the familiar rule
that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers.”33  This statement has led critics to state that Holy Trinity Church
is “the prototypical case involving the triumph of supposed ‘legislative
intent’ (a handy cover for judicial intent) over the text of the law.”34
31. Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) [hereinaf-
ter Holy Trinity Church]; see Brudney, supra note 6, at 57 (“The fifteen year period since the
Pepper decision contrasts with U.S. experience of 115 years since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Holy Trinity Church, the case that in retrospect is viewed as ushering in our
modern legislative history era.”) (citations omitted).
32. Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332, superseded by
Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 4, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214.
33. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 459.
34. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 18.
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As a result of the Supreme Court’s reliance on legislative history,
this case has frequently been cited as having changed the rules on the
use of legislative history in statutory interpretation.35  It has also been
criticized for having wrongly interpreted the statute at hand. Adrian
Vermeule has argued that a close look at the legislative history reveals
that Congress intended precisely what it said, namely to bar the impor-
tation of persons to perform “labor or service of any kind.”36
Though the Justices in Holy Trinity Church consulted legislative his-
tory to reach their conclusion, the case did not lay down any principled
limitations on when such history should be consulted.  Indeed, as noted
above, American judges did not begin to consistently consult legislative
history in statutory interpretation until decades after the case.37
The decision in Church of the Holy Trinity reveals a number of objec-
tions that may be raised against consultation of legislative history.  Jus-
tice Brewer’s statement that a “thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor
within the intention of its makers”38 demonstrates the risk that consul-
tation of legislative history might lead to complete disregard of the stat-
utory text itself.  This is an objection that has been raised by Justice
Scalia, one of the most ardent critics of the use of legislative history in
statutory interpretation.  He has argued that the enacted text always
trumps “unenacted legislative intent.”39  In addition, he has noted that
the best evidence of a statute’s purpose is the text adopted by both
Houses of Congress and submitted to the President.40  According to
Justice Scalia, where the statute contains an unambiguous phrase that
has a clearly accepted meaning in both legislative and judicial practice,
we do not permit statements of individual legislators or committees dur-
ing the course of the enactment process to expand or contradict its
meaning.41  In addition, there is a risk of upsetting the delicate com-
promise reached in Congress if the Court departs from the clearly
expressed statutory wording.42
A further objection to considering legislative history is the infringe-
ment of the constitutional principles of separation of powers, bicamera-
lism, and presentment. The Presentment Clause provides that a statute
35. See Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and His-
tory in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 905 (2000) (citing criticisms by
Justice Scalia).
36. Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1844–45 (1998).
37. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 365,
392 (1990); Justice Felix Frankfurter, The Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture (Mar. 18, 1947)
(transcript available at 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 542–43 (1947)); SCALIA, supra note 1, at
30.
38. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 459.
39. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
40. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98–99 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (cita-
tions omitted).
41. Id. at 98.
42. John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 33, 41 (2006) (citing Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002)).
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must pass through both Houses and be signed by the President to
become law.43  Separation of powers provides for a strict demarcation
of powers between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.  Jus-
tice Scalia argues that whatever Congress has not prescribed is left to
the legislature and the judiciary.44  He argues that Congress cannot
authorize a committee to fill in “minor details” of a law, no more than it
can authorize a committee to enact minor laws.45
Finally, it is questionable whether the statement of a single legisla-
tor should be attributable to all of Congress.  Justice Scalia argues that
the only conceivable basis for considering committee reports as authori-
tative is if they are considered indicative of the will of the entire House
or Senate, which they cannot be.46
As a matter of public policy, there is a risk of infringing on legal
certainty, the law’s predictability, and the ability of the law to guide
conduct if recourse is had to legislative history.47 There is also a risk of
imposing undue costs on litigants if they are required to pore over legis-
lative history to determine whether any authoritative statements had
been made during the legislation’s debates in Congress or Parliament.
C. What Lessons Can be Gleaned from the Arguments in Favor of and
Against Consultation of Legislative History?
As was argued above, there is value in considering legislative his-
tory where a statute is ambiguous.  However, the objections to the use
of legislative history should not be dismissed all too easily.  These con-
siderations show that the best approach would be to strictly circum-
scribe the circumstances under which legislative history may be
consulted.  The next section will show that it is currently difficult to
discern any true limiting principles regarding the use of legislative his-
tory in American courts.
IV. DRAWING PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION FROM
AMERICAN CASES
This section will consider whether it is possible to discern any con-
ditions limiting the use of legislative history for purposes of statutory
interpretation in the approach of the American courts.  This will be
done by way of considering some recent Supreme Court opinions that
have referred to legislative history.  This section will show that while the
Supreme Court has purported to refer to some limiting conditions, it
has not strictly adhered to them.  This discussion will show the need for
laying down conditions regarding the consultation of legislative history
that can be more strictly adhered to.
43. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 5.
44. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 35.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Aileen Kavanaugh, Pepper v. Hart and Matters of Constitutional Principle, 121 L.
Q. REV. 98, 102 (2005).
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A. The Requirement of Ambiguity
Many cases suggest that legislative history need not be consulted
where the statutory text is unambiguous.  Thus, Justice Sotomayor held
in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority that the Court need not rely on legis-
lative history given the text’s clarity, but noted that the history sup-
ported the justices’ interpretation of what it meant to be an “individual”
under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).48  She proceeded to
quote a report from the Hearing and Markup before the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Human Rights and
International Organizations, wherein one of the bill’s sponsors pro-
posed an amendment “to make it clear we are applying it to individuals
and not to corporations.”49  She noted that “the amendment was unani-
mously adopted, and the version of the bill reported out of Committee
reflected the change.”50  While recognizing the limits of the drafting
history, Justice Sotomayor found it “telling that the sole explanation for
substituting ‘individual’ for ‘person’ confirms what we have concluded
from the text alone.”51  If the Supreme Court were truly to adhere to a
requirement that the statute be unclear in order to allow consultation
of legislative history, then the Court would not have gone beyond the
text of the statute in Mohamad.  Rather than using legislative history as
an aid to interpret an unclear statute, it was used here merely to sup-
port the Court’s reading of the statute.
Justice Sotomayor took a similar approach in Milavetz, Gallop &
Milavetz v. United States, a case involving the application of certain provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act (BAPCPA) to attorneys.52  Here, again, Justice Sotomayor held that
reliance on the legislative history of the statute was unnecessary in light
of the statute’s unambiguous language, but in a footnote emphasized
that the legislative record provided support for the Government’s read-
ing of the statute.53  She argued that “[s]tatements in a Report of the
House Committee on the Judiciary regarding the Act’s purpose indi-
cate concern with abusive practices undertaken by attorneys as well as
other bankruptcy professionals.”54 Notably, she referred to hearings
from 1998.  Though these hearings preceded the BAPCPA’s enactment
by several years, she noted that these hearings formed part of the
record cited by the 2005 House Report.55  As above, a strict application
of a requirement of ambiguity would have prevented consultation of
the legislative history in this instance.
Allowing recourse to the legislative record despite the clarity of the
statute raises some serious public policy concerns, which Justice Scalia
emphasized in his dissent in Milavetz.  He began by noting that the
48. 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (2012).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 559 U.S. 229 (2010) [hereinafter Milavetz].
53. Id. at n.3.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Court’s cases have said that legislative history should not be resorted to
where the statutory text is clear.56 He criticized Justice Sotomayor’s reli-
ance on legislative history in her footnote, predicting that conscientious
lawyers would now no longer be able to disregard legislative history
where the statute was clear, and would have to spend time and their
clients’ money to buttress their case where the statutory text was unam-
biguously in their favor; and to attack an unambiguous text that was
against them.57 According to Justice Scalia, “[i]f legislative history is rel-
evant to confirm that a clear text means what it says, it is presumably
relevant to show that an apparently clear text does not mean what it
seems to say.”58 Thus, he concluded that “[e]ven for those who believe
in the legal fiction that committee reports reflect congressional intent,
[Justice Sotomayor’s footnote] is a bridge too far.”59 This criticism
shows that the use of legislative history to confirm the meaning of a
clear statute is even more objectionable than consulting legislative his-
tory in the case of an ambiguous statute.
Further confirmation of an apparent requirement of ambiguity
before allowing recourse to the legislative record is provided in Zuni
Public School District v. Department of Education, a case concerning distri-
bution of federal Impact Aid funds.60 Here, Justice Breyer noted that
neither legislative history nor the reasonableness of the method deter-
mined by the Secretary of Education would be determinative if the stat-
ute unambiguously indicated that Congress sought to foreclose the
Secretary’s interpretation.61 He noted that “if the intent of Congress is
clear and unambiguously expressed by the statutory language at issue,
that would be the end of our analysis.”62 Ultimately the Court found in
favor of the Department of Education. Justice Breyer agreed with the
Secretary of Education’s argument that the statute in question was
ambiguous on the specific formula to be used. The Court therefore
gave deference to the Secretary’s formula for calculating the distribu-
tion of federal Impact Aid funds.63
The concurrence and dissent in Zuni reveal two starkly differing
approaches. Justice Stevens in his concurrence noted that the legislative
history was “pellucidly clear and the statutory text [was] difficult to
fathom.”64 He added that any competent counsel would examine the
legislative history.65 In contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion heav-
ily criticized reliance on legislative history, arguing that it could never
56. Id. at 254 (citing United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997); Conn. Nat’l
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 550 U.S. 81 (2007).
61. Id. at 93.
62. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–43 (1984)).
63. Id. at 94.
64. Id. at 106.
65. Id.
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be “pellucidly clear.”66 Legislative history, as Justice Scalia noted, is
never voted on, or ordinarily even seen or heard by the lawmaking bod-
ies, which consist of both Houses of Congress and the President.67 To
illustrate the misuse to which legislative history may be put, Justice
Scalia cited Holy Trinity Church.68  According to him, every justice on the
Court in that case had disregarded the plain language of the statute
that forbade the hiring of a clergyman from abroad, in order to find
that the clergyman in the case at hand was not covered by the statute.69
A requirement that a statute first be deemed ambiguous is difficult
to adhere to. First of all, the courts have not spelled out how to deter-
mine ambiguity in a statute.  Even where the statutory text is clearly
unambiguous, the above cases show that some justices clearly cannot
help but rely on legislative history to support their conclusion.  Further,
as a matter of public policy, the justices’ referral to legislative history
regardless of clarity of the statute creates an incentive for lawyers to
pore through legislative history simply to find something that may bol-
ster their argument, regardless of the statute’s actual clarity.  This may
lead to increased time and expense and resulting litigation costs.  In a
legal system that is already marked by a sharp divide between rich and
poor litigants, the chasm should not be further exacerbated by favoring
wealthy litigants whose lawyers can afford to go through vast amounts of
legislative history to find statements supporting their argument.70  Pub-
lic policy, at a minimum, requires that use of legislative history be
restricted to those instances where the statute is unclear on its face.
The trend among the justices to use legislative history to support their
reading of an already clear text gives too much weight to legislative his-
tory in the face of a statute that has been duly enacted through bicam-
eralism and presentment.  Legislative history should be a last resort for
interpreting an unclear statute rather than authoritative support for the
already clear meaning of a statute.71
B. The Nature of the Legislative History Relied On
Not all statements in the legislative record should be given equal
weight.  This point was forcefully made by Justice Scalia in Zuni, where
he questioned “can it really be that this case turns, in the Court’s view,
on whether a freshman Congressman from New Mexico gave a floor
66. Id. at 117.
67. Id.
68. 143 U.S. at 457.
69. Zuni, 550 U.S. at 117.
70. See Beverly Moran & Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity: The Role
of Law and the Legal System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1219, 1236–37 (2007) (noting that
“[t]he United States spends only $300 million on legal services to serve over forty million
poor citizens”) (citations omitted).
71. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 327 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 622 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting
that the past practice of using legislative history “was ‘not the practice of using legislative
history for the purpose of giving authoritative content to the meaning of a statutory
text’”)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE110.txt unknown Seq: 13 20-APR-15 10:45
2015] NEED FOR CONDITIONS LIMITING USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 311
speech that only late-night C-SPAN junkies would witness?”72  He
argued that the only fair inference from Congress’s silence during
debates on the statute was that Congress had nothing further to say,
and that the statutory text was to do all of the talking.73
Justice Scalia also made the point about the authority of legislative
history in his concurrence in Samantar, arguing that the Court had
cited for its proposed interpretation a Committee Report that the Court
had no reason to believe was read by the Senate or House, or even
members of the Committee itself, who had never voted on the
Report.74  In addition, he noted that the Report cited to did not
address the particular issue in the case, but rather only spoke of “consu-
lar and diplomatic immunity,” which was not at issue in the case at
hand.75
A judge should not simply be able to rely on the statement of any
given Congressman in order to support his or her reading of a particu-
lar statute.  There is an inherent risk in relying on the legislative record
if the result is to allow a judge to cherry-pick those statements that con-
form to his interpretation of the statute and to ignore those that do not
conform to it.  What is needed is a hierarchy of legislative material.  It
has been argued that this has already been done to a certain extent in
U.S. courts, namely that American judges “privilege a small subset of
legislative materials, namely committee reports and sponsor state-
ments.”76  He notes that American courts generally look first to com-
mittee reports, and are somewhat leery of floor debates.  Thus, an
implicit hierarchy of sources of legislative history may be discernible in
American courts.77
As Justice Scalia’s comment in Zuni made clear, it is at the very
least desirable to limit the nature of legislative material that can be used
as support for a particular reading of a statute.  Such a requirement
would ensure that the legislative material relied upon had a certain
degree of legitimacy.  However, it is questionable whether such a
requirement could be adhered to in practice, and whether committee
reports may in fact be deemed authoritative.
C. Ambiguity in Legislative History
A major concern regarding the use of legislative history for pur-
poses of statutory interpretation is the reality of conflicting legislative
history.  In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,78 a case involving the
application of the Copyright Act, Justice Breyer made a reference to the
72. 550 U.S. at 121.
73. Id.
74. 560 U.S. at 328.
75. Id.
76. Nathan Oman, Note, Statutory Interpretation in Econotopia, 25 PACE L. REV. 49, 65
(2004) (noting that “in actual practice, American judges take a somewhat holistic
approach”).
77. Id. at 67.
78. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
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House Judiciary Committee Report79 as support for his reading of the
statutory text.  He prefaced this reference to the legislative history with
the words “[t]hose who find legislative history useful will find confirma-
tion in [citing the House Report].”  These words seemed to imply that
legislative history may provide authoritative support for the Court’s
reading of a statute.  He later referred to another House report, again
for the benefit of “those who find legislative history useful.”80  He ulti-
mately held that there was no geographic restriction on the “first sale”
doctrine in the Copyright Act, a conclusion which was supported both
by language and common-law history of the Act.81
However, Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in the same case
shows that legislative history may have been less clear than Justice
Breyer assumed it to be.  According to Justice Ginsburg, the legislative
history confirmed the plain text of the statute, and was hardly “incon-
clusive.”82  She argued that the language and legislative history of the
Act indicated that the “first sale” doctrine was not intended to apply to
copies of a copyrighted work manufactured abroad, thereby finding
against Justice Breyer’s conclusion.83
This case is an example of the difficulty of using legislative history
for purposes of statutory interpretation, namely the possibility of con-
flicting or inconclusive legislative history.  If the courts were to insist on
a requirement that the legislative history relied on be clear, then per-
haps courts should not be allowed to rely on legislative history where it
is ambiguous.  However, there will likely be many instances where the
legislative history will be ambiguous.  This is a problem that does not
have an easy solution.  In such cases, however, legislative history may be
best used in conjunction with other methods of statutory interpreta-
tion, such as a purposive approach, and by discerning which elements
of legislative history best support the reading of a statute through that
particular interpretive lens.
V. THE BRITISH APPROACH: SETTING CONDITIONS ON THE USE OF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In light of the disagreement over the use of legislative history in
American courts, it is instructive to consider whether British courts have
adopted a workable approach to legislative history by laying down con-
ditions regarding its consultation.  The experience of British courts sub-
sequent to the decision in Pepper v. Hart provides a good indication of
the utility of laying down limiting conditions.  This section will lay out
the changes brought about by Pepper v. Hart and will then consider the
impact that the case had on subsequent cases.
79. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., REP. ON COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION 5 (Comm. Print 1965).
80. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1361.
81. Id. at 1363–64.
82. Id. at 1382.
83. Id. at 1382–83.
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A. The Status of Legislative History Prior to Pepper v. Hart
The relaxation of the exclusionary rule in Pepper is particularly
noteworthy because British courts had long rejected using legislative
history for purposes of statutory interpretation.  As early as 1769, British
courts held that a statute must take its meaning from the enacted text,
not from the changes made in the House where it arose.84  The exclu-
sionary rule was extended to prohibit the use of reports made by com-
missioners upon which the legislation was based.85  However, despite
the apparent rigor of the exclusionary rule, some exceptions began to
develop over time.  As Lord Browne-Wilkinson noted in Pepper, the
courts had for some time permitted “reports of commissioners, includ-
ing law commissioners, and white papers to be looked at for the pur-
pose solely of ascertaining the mischief which the statute is intended to
cure but not for the purpose of discovering the meaning of the words
used by Parliament to effect such cure . . . .”86  As a result of Britain’s
party-controlled parliamentary system, white papers could give insight
into the intention behind the enacted statute.
A further encroachment on the exclusionary rule prior to Pepper
was the covert consultation of legislative history by judges.  Lord
Browne-Wilkinson noted in Pepper that some judges had in the past
admitted to privately consulting legislative history.  The most striking
example of this was Lord Denning M.R.’s admission in the Court of
Appeal case of Hadmor Productions Ltd. v. Hamilton that he had relied on
his own research into Hansard to reach his conclusion regarding the
proper interpretation of the statute in that case.87  When that case
reached the House of Lords, counsel argued that they would have liked
to have drawn Lord Denning’s attention to other passages of legislative
history, had they known that he was going to consult it.88
British cases reveal that a primary justification for the adoption of
the exclusionary rule was a practical one.  The House of Commons
debates were initially not fully and accurately reported, making it
impossible for either of the House of Parliament or litigants to consult
such history.89  Even after Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates offered an
authoritative and comprehensive report of proceedings starting in
1909, there was still a fear that requiring parties to examine vast
amounts of Hansard would be unduly burdensome, particularly on par-
ties with lesser resources.90
84. Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 217 (K.B.).
85. Salkeld v. Johnson, (1848) 2 Exch. 256, 273 (Exch.).
86. [1993] A.C. 593, 630 (H.L.). White Papers constitute the government’s firm
proposal for legislation, which may be published after the government has issued Green
Papers, which set out and invite comments from interested parties on particular proposals
for legislation. See SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 10, at 86.
87. Pepper, [1993] A.C. at 636 (referring to Hadmor Prod. Ltd. v. Hamilton, [1983]
A.C. 191).
88. Hadmor, [1983] A.C. at 233.
89. See Millar, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. at 217 (noting that the history of changes that a
bill has undergone in one House are not known to the other House or to the sovereign).
90. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 8.
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B. The Decision in Pepper v. Hart
Despite the reasons supporting the adoption of the exclusionary
rule, the objections to the rule ultimately prevailed in the House of
Lords’ decision in Pepper v. Hart, which significantly relaxed the rule.
The issue in the case was how to measure the taxable fringe benefit
received by a member of the teaching staff at a boys’ school whose sons
had for many years been educated there at a charge of one-fifth of the
fees charged to the general public.91  The education of the children at
reduced fees was a taxable benefit under section 61(1) of the Finance
Act 1976.92  The issue that arose was the amount to be treated as an
emolument, namely “the cash equivalent of the benefit.”93  The taxpay-
ers contended that this should be calculated as the additional, or margi-
nal, cost to the school of educating the boys, which would have been
zero.94  The Inland Revenue, on the other hand, argued that the
“expense incurred in or in connection with” the provision of education
for the boys (pursuant to the language of the statute)95 was the same as
the expense incurred in connection with the education of other stu-
dents, and therefore constituted a proportionate part of running the
school.96  The House of Lords did not initially consider the statute’s
legislative history, and it was not considered at oral argument.  As a
result, the Law Lords concluded that the “cost of the benefit” meant the
average cost of providing the same educational benefit to all boys in the
school.97
Prior to handing down the decision, however, the Law Lords
became aware that an examination of the parliamentary proceedings
leading to the enactment of the Finance Act of 1976 might shed light
on which of the two rival contentions represented the intention of Par-
liament.98  The House of Lords decided that there should be a further
hearing to consider whether, and in what circumstances, parliamentary
debates might be used as an aid to interpreting a statute, particularly
regarding the debates in Parliament concerning the provisions of the
Finance Acts.99  After a second hearing before an enlarged panel of
seven judges, the Law Lords decided that they should depart from the
exclusionary rule and that recourse to parliamentary debates would
provide guidance in the case at hand.100
91. [1993] A.C. at 621.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 622.
94. Id.
95. Finance Act 1976, 1976, c. 40, § 63(2) (“Subject to the following subsections,
the cost of a benefit is the amount of any expensive incurred in or in connection with its
provision, and (here and in those subsections) includes a proper proportion of any
expense relating partly to the benefit and partly to other matters.”).
96. Pepper, [1993] A.C. at 622.
97. Id. at 623 (noting that the appeal was initially heard before their Lordships
without reference to Parliamentary proceedings, and was subsequently set for a
rehearing).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 597.
100. Id. at 640.
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Lord Browne-Wilkinson, giving the leading judgment in the case,
was cautious in deciding that the exclusionary rule should be relaxed.
He noted that in most cases reference to parliamentary materials would
not shed light on the matter.  However, in the cases where it was found
that the very question before the court had been considered in Parlia-
ment, he saw no reason for the courts to blind themselves in light of
Parliament’s clear indication of intention.101  He concluded that “[t]he
court cannot attach a meaning to words which they cannot bear, but if
the words are capable of bearing more than one meaning why should
not Parliament’s true intention be enforced rather than thwarted?”102
He limited the relaxation of the exclusionary rule by laying down three
requirements that must be satisfied in order to allow recourse to legisla-
tive history.  The requirements are: (a) the legislation must be ambigu-
ous, obscure, or lead to an absurdity; (b) the material relied upon
consists of one or more statements by a Minister or other promoter of
the Bill together with such other Parliamentary material as is necessary
to understand such statements and their effect; (c) and the statements
relied upon must be clear.103
Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s opinion addressed a number of practical
objections that had been raised regarding consultation of legislative his-
tory.  It is clear that Lord Browne-Wilkinson did not wish to take the
American courts’ unfettered approach to consultation of legislative his-
tory.  He drew a sharp distinction between the approach of American
courts and the approach of other common law countries in using legis-
lative history.  He emphasized that the experience in American courts,
where legislative history had for many years generally been much more
admissible than he was suggesting, showed the importance of maintain-
ing strict control over the use of such material.104  In contrast, he
pointed to experience in New Zealand and Australia, where they had
relaxed the rule to approximately the extent that he had suggested.105
He noted that there was no evidence of any complaints of the nature
made in American courts coming from those countries.106  His state-
ment that it would likely be the rare case in which legislative history was
of utility,107 as well as the three requirements laid down to determine
whether legislative history should be considered,108 further underline
that he intended to strictly circumscribe the instances in which courts
should be allowed to consult legislative history, and did not wish to
embark upon the path taken by American courts.  Lord Browne-Wilkin-
101. Id. at 635.
102. Id. at 634–635.
103. Id. at 640.
104. Id. at 637.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 634–635.
108. These being that (a) the legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an
absurdity; (b) the material relied upon consists of one or more statements by a Minister
or other promoter of the Bill together if necessary with such other Parliamentary material
as is necessary to understand such statements and their effect; (c) the statements relied
upon are clear. (Pepper, [1993] A.C. at 640).
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son clearly believed that by laying down principled limitations, the Brit-
ish courts would not run into the same difficulties faced by American
courts.
Concerning the risk of taking up the court’s time by considering
unnecessary amounts of parliamentary material, he believed the con-
cern was unfounded so long as courts insisted that Parliamentary mate-
rial only be introduced in the limited cases he had mentioned and
where such material contained a clear indication from the Minister of
the mischief aimed at, or the nature of the cure intended, by the
legislation.109
Regarding the practical difficulties of accessing parliamentary
materials, Lord Browne-Wilkinson argued that these difficulties were
often overstated, the problem being one of expense and effort, not one
of availability of material.110  He also dismissed the objection that law-
yers would have trouble understanding parliamentary procedure and
hence how much weight to give individual statements.111  Finally, Lord
Browne-Wilkinson considered a last practical objection, namely that
legal advisers faced with an ambiguous statutory provision may feel that
they have to research the materials to see whether they yielded the pot
of gold; in essence, a clear indication of Parliament’s intentions.  He
dismissed that concern as well, arguing that if a reading of Hansard
showed that there was nothing of significance said by the Minister in
relation to the clause in question, further research would become
pointless.112
A final objection addressed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson was of a
constitutional nature.  Article 9 of the English Bill of Rights protects
freedom of speech in parliamentary debates.113  According to the Attor-
ney-General in Pepper, the use of Hansard for purposes of statutory
interpretation would constitute a “questioning” in violation of Article 9
of the Bill of Rights.114  But in the opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson,
Article 9 could not have the effect of stifling the freedom of all to com-
ment on what was said in Parliament. Article 9, viewed against its histor-
ical background, was intended to prevent Members of Parliament from
suffering civil or criminal penalties for what they said in Parliament.115
Members of Parliament were thus allowed to discuss what they, as
opposed to the monarch, chose to discuss.116  Lord Browne-Wilkinson
did not consider the consultation of legislative history to constitute a
“questioning” for Article 9 purposes – [f]ar from questioning the inde-
109. Pepper, [1993] A.C. at 640.
110. Id. at 636.
111. Id. at 637.
112. Id. at 637.
113. The Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 1(9) (“That the Freedome of
Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or ques-
tioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament.”).
114. [1993] A.C. at 638.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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pendence of Parliament and its debates, the courts would be giving
effect to what is said and done there.”117
In addition to addressing the objections to consulting legislative
history, Lord Browne-Wilkinson gave a number of reasons in support of
relaxing the exclusionary rule.  For one thing, he noted that judges
were already allowed to consult government White Papers in order to
determine statutory meaning.  He deemed it artificial to draw a distinc-
tion between consulting government White Papers in order to deter-
mine the mischief aimed at by the statute but not to consider
Parliament’s intention in enacting the statute.118  In addition, he recog-
nized that some consultation of parliamentary debates was already hap-
pening in practice, though unofficially so, referring to the above-
mentioned Hadmor case.  He noted that parties in such situations do
not know and have no opportunity to address the judge on the
matter.119
The new test laid down by Lord Browne-Wilkinson was applied in
Pepper itself.  It was determined that the statutory provision of the
Finance Act was ambiguous, and that the parliamentary debates shed
light on its meaning.  It was also held reasonable to attribute to Parlia-
ment as a whole the views repeatedly uttered by the Financial Secre-
tary.120  As a result, the House of Lords found in favor of the
taxpayers.121
C. Criticism of Pepper v. Hart
Much of the criticism that was leveled against the decision in Pep-
per mirrors the objections that have been raised against consultation of
legislative history in American courts.  This subsection will consider the
objections that have been raised, which will help better understand
whether laying down limiting conditions regarding the use of legislative
history is workable in practice.
One scholar perceived the new rule laid down in Pepper as a deci-
sion that would have been best left to the legislature rather than the
courts.122  Others sought to limit the impact of the case by suggesting
that it was only authority for a principle of estoppel, whereby a categori-
cal assurance by the government as to the meaning of legislation would
prevent the government from later contending for a different
meaning.123
117. Id.
118. Id. at 635.
119. Id. at 636.
120. Id. at 642.
121. Id.
122. See Richard Buxton, How the Common Law Gets Made: Hedley Byrne and Other
Cautionary Tales, (2009) 125 L. Q. Rev. 60, 72 (arguing that the decision in Pepper was a
“rush to judgment, that would not have occurred if it had been recognized that the revo-
cation of long-standing rules and the invention of new remedies is the business of the
legislature and not of the courts”).
123. See Lord Steyn in McDonnell v. Christian Bros. Tr., [2003] UKHL 63, [2004] 1
A.C. 1101, [29].
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As a constitutional matter, it has been argued that Pepper’s relaxa-
tion of the exclusionary rule violates the deeply-enshrined principle of
parliamentary privilege, laid down in Article 9 of the English Bill of
Rights, which safeguards the freedom of parliamentary debates and
proceedings from impeachment or questioning in courts.124  Accord-
ing to Philip Joseph, the effect of the decision in Pepper has been to
“compromise Parliament’s ability to function independently free from
outside interventions or repercussions, and . . . realign the relationship
between the political and judicial branches in ad hoc and unplanned
ways.”125  As noted above, this constitutional concern was addressed
and dismissed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Pepper. While recognizing
that Article 9 was a provision “of the highest constitutional impor-
tance,” he argued that it would be stretching the meaning of “question-
ing” too far to hold that reference to parliamentary statements for
purposes of statutory interpretation constituted a violation of the arti-
cle.126  Rather, the purpose of such reference in court would be to give
effect to what was being done in Parliament, rather than questioning its
independence.
Even if legislators do not fear liability for their statements in Parlia-
ment, there is nonetheless a concern as to the effect that awareness of
the power of their statements might have on their minds.  Opportunis-
tic legislators might take advantage of their power to exert influence
over the courts’ interpretation of statutes by making particular state-
ments as to the meaning of statutes in Parliament.127  As Lord Steyn has
argued, “why should a minister not take advantage of the opportunity
under Pepper to explain the effect of the legislation in the way in which
the government would like it to be understood?”128  If this were the
case, then the statements of a minister promoting a Bill would be “no
more than indications of what the government would like the law to
be.”129 The risk that the government might “plant” questions so as to
elicit Pepper responses in Parliament suggests that the reliability of par-
liamentary statements made in the wake of Pepper might be questiona-
ble.130  An example of such awareness of the potential use by the courts
of statements made in Parliament is provided by the debates concern-
124. The Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 1(9) (“That the Freedome of
Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or ques-
tioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament.”).
125. Philip A. Joseph, Parliament’s Attenuated Privilege of Freedom of Speech, 126 L. Q.
REV. 568, 568 (2010).
126. Pepper, [1993] A.C. at 638.
127. Joseph argues that the effect of Pepper is that ministers might be economical in
stating reasons for their decisions in Parliament, or that they might misrepresent or
embellish the purpose of the Bill, knowing that the courts might use their statements for
purposes of interpretation. The result would be interpretations of statutes that serve the
government’s interests.  Joseph, supra note 125, at 574.
128. Johan Steyn, Pepper v Hart; A Re-examination, 21 O.J.L.S. 59, 65–69 (2001).
129. Id. at 65.
130. See Joseph, supra note 125, at 576 (“It was also inevitable that governments
would resort to planted questions to elicit Pepper v. Hart responses.”); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The Circumstances of Politics and the Application of Statutes, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 558,
570–71 (2000) (noting that legislative history may now be “less illuminating in the United
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ing the enactment of the Human Rights Act in Parliament. In response
to a question regarding the omission to incorporate Article 13 of the
European Convention on Human Rights in the Human Rights Bill
before the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor replied, “One always
has in mind Pepper v. Hart when one is asked questions of that kind. I
shall reply as candidly as I may.”131 This statement shows the practical
effect that Pepper has had on parliamentary debates and the risk that
questioning in Parliament may now be geared towards future use in
judicial review.
The concern about planted questions flows into another constitu-
tional concern, namely separation of powers. There is a fear that using
ministerial statements for purposes of statutory interpretation gives the
British Parliament, and with that the executive, too much power over
the meaning of statutes. Aileen Kavanaugh argues that by allowing the
judiciary to accept ministerial statements for purposes of statutory inter-
pretation, the executive is given power to make law, allowing “Ministers
to specify the details of statutory meaning, even though these details are
not incorporated in the statutory text.”132 Giving the executive such
power cannot be reconciled with the constitutional principle of separa-
tion of powers and of vesting lawmaking power in Parliament.133 In
addition to giving the executive too much power in Parliament, there is
also a risk that the executive, through its statements in Parliament,
might encroach upon the judiciary’s function of independently inter-
preting legislation.134 While Aileen Kavanaugh recognizes Lord
Browne-Wilkinson’s acknowledgment of the practice of consulting gov-
ernment White Papers for contextual information in statutory interpre-
tation, she emphasizes this was not what was done in Pepper. Rather, the
ministerial statements were treated as an authoritative explanation of
the meaning of the statute.135 In light of Britain’s party-controlled sys-
tem, with the executive being formed by the majority in the House of
Commons, most legislative proposals constitute policy decisions made
by the executive.136 In light of Britain’s party-controlled system, with
the executive being formed by the majority in the House of Commons,
most legislative proposals constitute policy decisions made by the exec-
utive.137 Giving legislative history authoritative force creates a real risk
of allowing the executive to encroach upon the judiciary’s function by
means of planting statements in the legislature.
The above-noted criticisms are ones that can also be raised in
American courts. While the risk of the executive exerting excessive
power in the legislature and hence in the courts is unique to Britain’s
Kingdom after Pepper, if the relevance of parliamentary debates to subsequent legislators
inspires legislators to plant their own partial views into the record”).
131. Steyn, supra note 128, at 69 (quoting Hansard (H.L.) (Nov. 18, 1997), col.
476).
132. Kavanaugh, supra note 47.
133. Id.
134. Id. 102–103.
135. Id. at 103–104.
136. SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 10, at 84.
137. Id.
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party-controlled system, the risk that legislators may plant statements in
Congress is equally applicable in the United States, as is the risk that
legislators may exert excessive control over courts’ interpretations of
statutes.
A further criticism made against Pepper that is applicable in both
the British and American context is that consultation of legislative his-
tory allows courts to give effect to Parliament or Congress’s unenacted,
rather than enacted, intentions, despite the fact that only the latter
have gone through the legislative process and been voted on. There are
good reasons for requiring courts to respect and give effect to the
enacted text of the statute, which has resulted from the legislative pro-
cess when interpreting legislation.138  While Parliament and Congress
have an institutionalized system for giving effect to its enacted inten-
tions, namely the statutory text, they have no mechanism for expressing
their unenacted intentions, and there is, therefore, no way of knowing
either their unenacted intentions or what support they had.139 Allowing
recourse to legislative history would allow Parliament and Congress’s
unenacted intentions to trump their enacted intentions contained in
the authoritative text, thus subverting the rationale of the legislative
process.140 “[J]udges might replace the intentions contained in the
authoritative statutory text with intentions which did not command
majority support in Parliament.”141 The consequence of such reliance
on parliamentary debates is the introduction of an element of uncer-
tainty into the law.  It is undesirable that people should be left to guess
the true meaning of a statute based on Parliament or Congress’s
unenacted intentions contained in their debates. Citizens should be
able to rely on the text of the statute as a complete intimation to guide
their conduct.  Thus, it has been argued that one should proceed cau-
tiously in considering material for purposes of statutory interpretation
that is not readily available to the ordinary citizen.142 The effect of Pep-
per might be that diligent lawyers feel required to engage in extensive
138. Kavanaugh, supra note 47, at 99–100.  In the American context, see Justice
Scalia’s statement in Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1844)).
139. Kavanaugh, supra note 47, at 100.
140. Id. at 101 (citing Steyn, supra note 128, at 68 (arguing that Pepper v. Hart
treats ministerial policy statements as a “source of law”)). Pepper has also been described
as offering “an alternative way of legislating.” See also J. C. Jenkins, Pepper v. Hart: A
Draftsman’s Perspective, 15 STATUTE L. REV. 23 (1994).
141. Kavanaugh, supra note 47, at 106.
142. Lord Oliver of Aylmerton noted in Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593, 619–620
(H.L.) that,
[A statute is] the formal and complete intimation to the citizen of a particular
rule of the law which he is enjoined, sometimes under penalty, to obey and by
which he is both expected and entitled to regulate his conduct. We must, there-
fore, I believe, be very cautious in opening the door to the reception of material
not readily or ordinarily accessible to the citizen whose rights and duties are to
be affected by the words in which the legislature has elected to express its will.
Id.
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research which is both costly and time-consuming in order to deter-
mine the meaning behind the statute.143
Though these concerns are certainly valid, it is worth noting that
Lord Browne-Wilkinson emphasized the need for strict adherence to
the three requirements he laid down.  If consultation of legislative his-
tory is strictly reserved for instances where the statute is deliberately left
unclear or ambiguous by the legislature, it might be argued that the
unfairness towards private citizens is somewhat diminished.  In such a
situation, it seems that the unfairness would not be generated by the
courts’ use of legislative history for purposes of interpreting the statute,
but rather by Parliament’s initial enactment of an ambiguous statute.
Requiring lawyers to do extensive research into a statute’s legislative
history to determine its meaning would simply be a consequence of the
legislature’s having enacted an ambiguous statute.  Rather than consid-
ering this as an argument against the use of legislative history, it might
be considered an argument in favor of a condition limiting recourse to
such legislative instances where the meaning of the statute is obviously
unclear on its face.
A final constitutional consideration is whether it is legitimate to
attribute to the intention of the legislature as a whole the statement of
one minister or member of Congress.  As Aileen Kavanaugh has argued,
members of Parliament may remain silent about a ministerial statement
for many reasons, perhaps precisely because the statement has not been
incorporated into the statute and hence does not have the force of
law.144  This concern is likely somewhat diminished today.  Twenty
years have passed since the decision in Pepper, and members of Parlia-
ment should now be well aware that their silence in the face of state-
ments about a statute’s meaning might be interpreted as acquiescence.
Indeed, as the Lord Chancellor’s remarks above show,145 members of
Parliament are now cognizant of the use to which their statements in
Parliament might now be put in the courts.  Applying these considera-
tions to the American context, it could also be argued that if Congress
or the Supreme Court laid down conditions regarding the use of legisla-
tive history, the mere knowledge that such conditions exist would
encourage legislators to be more clear or more emphatic during
debates in Congress and not to remain silent in the face of disagree-
ment with a given statement.
D. Is It Possible to Lay Down Conditions that Address the Objections to the
Use of Legislative History?
While it would be desirable for American courts to adopt limiting
conditions, it is important to recognize that the Pepper requirements are
deficient in some respects.  The requirement of ambiguity fails to rec-
ognize that some statutes do not appear ambiguous on their face, but
rather become ambiguous when recourse to legislative history is had.  A
143. Kavanaugh, supra note 47, at 107–08.
144. Id. at 105.
145. 583 Parl. Deb., H.L. (1997) 466 (U.K.).
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good example of this is the case of Pepper itself, in which the statute
appeared clear, but the Law Lords later decided on a rehearing when it
was brought to their attention that the Finance Secretary had addressed
the very issue in the case during parliamentary debates.146  In addition,
novel facts may arise that were not contemplated by the legislature.147
In such circumstances, it is questionable how much light can be shed
on apparently ambiguous statutes through consultation of legislative
history.  Finally, the legislature may intentionally leave a question open,
thereby punting a particular policy question to the courts.148  However,
despite these concerns, there will still be cases where a statute is ambig-
uous on its face, and the issue was clearly discussed in parliamentary or
congressional debates.  Even if the precise issue at hand was not dis-
cussed in debates, it may be possible for courts to infer the intention of
Parliament or Congress based on statements made during debates.  The
question is simply when courts should be allowed to use statements
made during debates in Congress or Parliament and how much weight
should be given to such statements.
In order to determine whether American courts should adopt con-
ditions similar to the one adopted in Pepper, one should consider subse-
quent cases that have been decided in the wake of Pepper.  As noted
above, it is clear that Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Pepper sought to avoid
the very problem that American courts have faced in light of broad,
unfettered recourse to legislative history.149  The question arises
whether the limitations in Pepper succeeded in maintaining strict con-
trol, or whether subsequent British cases are simply comparable to
American cases in their use of legislative history.
A great fear that critics of Pepper had was that the decision would
lead to an excessive reference to legislative history by litigants, in the
hopes of persuading the courts of their desired interpretation of a
given statute. In Pepper itself, Lord Mackay, dissenting, objected to relax-
ation of the exclusionary rule based on considerations of practice and
principle.150  It is for that reason that Lord Bingham in R. (on the appli-
cation of Spath Holme) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and
the Regions, insisted that the conditions laid down by the House in Pepper
be strictly adhered to.151  He argued that the worst of all possible worlds
would be reached if parties and the courts dredged through vast
amounts of conflicting parliamentary statements simply to find that the
statute required no further elucidation or that the statements were not
clear and unequivocal.  Lord Bingham found that neither the first nor
the third threshold test under Pepper was satisfied here.152  Reference
could not be made to ministerial statements in Parliament for purposes
of construing s. 31 of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1985 because the
146. Id. at 623.
147. See Mary D. Fan, Textual Imagination, 111 YALE L.J. 1251, 1258 (2002).
148. Id.
149. [1993] A.C. at 637.
150. Id. at 615.
151. [2001] 2 A.C. 349, 392 (H.L.).
152. Id. at 392–394.
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statute was neither ambiguous, nor were there clear and unequivocal
ministerial statements that could be relied upon.
A further important pronouncement on the requirements in Pepper
was made in Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Others, in
which Lord Bingham stated that this was a good illustration of the sort
of case in which the limited departure permitted by the House in Pepper
v. Hart could not be properly relied upon as an aid to interpretation.153
It was held that the Secretary of State’s statements in debates on the
Northern Ireland Act of 1998 neither explained the language of the
statute nor accurately stated its effect.154  As Lord Bingham noted, “It is
not surprising that a minister, called upon at very short notice to answer
a number of unexpected points, failed to speak with the precision of a
parliamentary draftsman.”155  This case also raised awareness of the
consequences of Pepper for purposes of references to Hansard in litiga-
tion.  Lord Hoffman noted that Lord Mackay had “turned out to be the
better prophet” in Pepper, pointing out that “[r]eferences to Hansard
are now fairly frequently included in argument and beneath those ref-
erences there must lie a large spoil heap of material which has been
mined in the course of research without yielding anything worthy even
of a submission.”156  He noted that it would be rare that a statute be
construed to mean something other than what a member of the public,
aware of all the background to the legislation but unaware of what indi-
vidual members of Parliament had said during debates, would take it to
mean.157  This case clearly signaled caution regarding the use of legisla-
tive history for purposes of statutory interpretation.  Similarly, Lord
Carswell recognized in another case that Pepper had been out of judicial
favor in recent years, no doubt due to its over-use.158  However, he also
emphasized that the principle had a place in statutory interpretation,
and that it would be a shame if Pepper were now to be sidelined.159
Cases following Pepper have consistently referred to the conditions
laid down in that case. As Lord Carswell noted, they “have been authori-
tatively stated in a number of cases.”160  Recent cases have shown that
the problem of excessive reference to legislative history by litigants,
alluded to in Robinson and Spath Holme, are still present.  In Assange v.
Sweden, Lord Philips lamented that “[c]ounsel for both parties had
placed before [the court] a substantial volume of parliamentary mate-
rial without any close analysis as to whether this was admissible as an aid
to interpretation of the 2003 Act under the doctrine of Pepper v[.] Hart
or for any other reason.”161 Though twenty years have passed since the
decision in Pepper, cases such as Assange show that there are still clear
153. [2002] UKHL 32 at [17].
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at [40].
157. Id.
158. Harding v. Wealands, [2006] UKHL 32 at [81].
159. Id.
160. Id. at [82].
161. [2012] UKSC 22 at [11].
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attempts to circumvent the conditions for use of legislative history that
were laid down in Pepper, despite the House of Lords’ insistence in
Robinson and Spath Holme that the requirements would be strictly
adhered to.162
Though there are obvious difficulties in preventing litigants from
referring to vast amounts of legislative history that support their argu-
ment in the hopes that the courts might be persuaded by some of it, the
above discussions show that there are numerous examples of cases in
which the British courts have refused to even look at legislative history
because one of the three Pepper conditions had not been met.  As such,
the courts do indeed seem to be sending a strong message to litigants
that legislative material will only be consulted when all three conditions
have been met.  Of the conditions, the requirement that the statute be
unclear or ambiguous appears to be the most frequent reason for refus-
ing to consult legislative history.163  The other condition that has been
heavily used as a reason not to consult legislative history is the require-
ment that the legislative history statements relied on be clear.164
Though difficulties are inherent in allowing recourse to legislative his-
tory, it is noteworthy that subsequent British cases have all consistently
referred to the conditions laid down in Pepper to determine whether or
not to consult such materials.
Though Pepper clearly took a step in the direction of the American
approach to treatment of legislative history in statutory interpretation,
Pepper and subsequent cases have shown that the British courts did not
intend to go entirely down the American path.
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR THE USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
AMERICAN COURTS
This section will consider why it would not be possible for Ameri-
can courts to take the approach of the British courts in Pepper v. Hart.  It
will then discuss what considerations would have to be taken into
account in laying down conditions regarding the consultation of legisla-
tive history in U.S. courts.
162. See also Wilson v. Sec’y of State for Trade & Indus. [2003] UKHL 40 at [140]
(arguing that there must be no “extension to the Pepper v[.] Hart decision or relaxing the
strict observation of the safeguards which it included . . . .”).
163. See In re G (A Minor), [2013] EWHC 134, [114] (Fam) (holding that there was
no ambiguity in the relevant provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
2008, and hence, that the court would not be justified in consulting parliamentary pro-
ceedings for statutory interpretation); Re IBM Pension Plan, [2012] WL 4808667 at [55]
(holding that the relevant provisions of the Pensions Act 2004 could be construed apply-
ing ordinary canons of construction, and that the sort of ambiguity which justified
recourse to Hansard was not present).
164. See Urenco UK Ltd. v. Urenco UK Pension Tr.  Co. Ltd., [2012] EWHC 1495,
[88] (Ch) (holding that the parliamentary statements referred to did not provide the
clear statement required by Pepper v. Hart); R. v. Coulson, [2013] EWCA Crim 1026, [19]
(applying usual principles of statutory interpretation when relevant provision “could be
considered ambiguous or obscure, there [was] no clear statement by the promoter of the
legislation which casts light on the issue . . . .”).
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A. Could a Framework Based on the Principles in Pepper v. Hart Address
the Concerns Regarding the Use of Legislative History?
Having considered the development in British courts subsequent
to Pepper v. Hart, it is worth considering whether U.S. courts should
adopt similar conditions.  As has been noted above, the British courts
have attempted to faithfully adhere to these conditions, in many cases
refusing to consult the legislative record where the statute was clear or
the legislative history sought to be relied upon was unclear.165
As mentioned at the beginning of this Note, the question arises as
to whether U.S. courts should have no conditions at all, adopt similar
conditions, or not allow recourse to legislative history at all.  It is clearly
undesirable to set no conditions at all regarding the use of legislative
history.  It is unduly burdensome for litigants to have no guidance what-
soever regarding when legislative history may be consulted and when it
may not be.
There are a number of reasons why the British approach would not
work in American courts. Firstly, if any conditions were to be laid down,
they would have to come from Congress, rather than the courts,
because methods of statutory interpretation do not have stare decisis
effect in American courts.  In addition, the requirement that the state-
ment relied upon be one made by the proponent of the bill is also not
workable in U.S. courts.  Instead, there would have to be a requirement
that the material relied upon be a committee report or something simi-
larly authoritative.  Finally, the requirement that the statement relied
upon be clear creates a risk of cherry-picking in the courts, leading
judges to ignore certain statements and give weight to others on the
basis of clarity.
The key to developing conditions regarding the use of legislative
history is to recognize the reality that legislative history will always
remain a valuable tool in statutory interpretation, while at the same
time addressing the concerns that have been raised regarding the use
of legislative history in statutory interpretation.  The concerns regard-
ing the use of legislative history have been discussed above both with
regards to the reaction to the relaxing of the exclusionary rule in Pepper
v. Hart and with regards to the use of legislative history in American
courts.  To summarize, these concerns are the violation of separation of
powers and the principles of bicameralism and presentment by giving
effect to unenacted legislative intent.166  In addition, there is a fear that
an opportunistic lawmaker may make a statement in Congress or Parlia-
ment simply to benefit from the weight that might be given to such
statements when the statute is later interpreted in court. Finally, there is
a fear that allowing such recourse would be unduly burdensome for
litigants, requiring them to pore over legislative history in every case
simply to find something that might support their argument and their
reading of the statute.
165. See supra notes 162–63.
166. See Kavanaugh, supra note 47, at 102; SCALIA, supra note 1, at 29.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE110.txt unknown Seq: 28 20-APR-15 10:45
326 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 29
B. What Considerations Would Have to Be Taken into Account in
Developing Conditions Limiting Recourse to Legislative History?
As was noted above, many jurists and commentators have argued
that the use of legislative history violates principles of separation of
powers and of bicameralism and presentment.167  The concern about
separation of powers is even more apparent in the United States, where
there is a clear separation between the three branches of government.
First, one would have to lay down criteria for how to determine whether
a statute is ambiguous.  If a statute were deemed ambiguous according
to these criteria, then it could not be said to violate separation of pow-
ers to consult other legislative materials.  Since the statute was not clear
on its face, the courts should be allowed to go deeper by looking at
legislative history.  In addition, the conditions would have to stipulate
that legislative history should never be deemed authoritative.  While
judges should be allowed to consult the legislative history as back-
ground information under certain circumstances, they may choose to
give it as much weight as any other interpretive tool, such as textualist
or purposive approaches.  Though the Pepper requirement of clarity
poses the risk of cherry picking, it is helpful to focus the judges’ atten-
tion on the need to only consult clear statements.  The courts would
still exercise their judicial function by considering the clarity of the stat-
ute and the weight to be given to the legislative history at issue.
The concern about the opportunistic lawmaker making deliberate
statements in Congress for purposes of influencing statutory interpreta-
tion is a valid one.  However, this concern can be limited by providing
that the courts should exercise prudence in evaluating legislative his-
tory, and should only consider certain types of legislative history, such
as committee reports.  Even if such a committee report turned out to be
made on opportunistic grounds, the courts would always have discre-
tion as to how much weight to give to the legislative history.  If it
became apparent that the statement relied upon was made on opportu-
nistic grounds, they could simply disregard it.  If Congress were to
adopt limiting conditions, it would hopefully signal to lawmakers that
“planting” statements in Congress would not necessarily lead the courts
to adopt their desired interpretation of the statute.
The burden on litigants is also not to be easily dismissed.  There is
a very real risk that lawyers might find themselves forced to expend vast
amounts of time and money on researching a statute’s legislative his-
tory.  This is so because some statutes may appear ambiguous though
the courts might deem them clear.  A conscientious lawyer would there-
fore research the legislative history in the event that a court did deem a
statute unclear.  However, in a system where some judges are willing to
look at legislative history and some are not, this risk is inevitable.  Set-
ting down limiting conditions would put some boundaries on how
much research would have to be done. For one thing, a wholly clear
statute would not require additional research.  This would address the
167. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 29.
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concerns that Justice Scalia had in recent cases where legislative history
was used simply to confirm the Court’s interpretation of a seemingly
clear statute.168 Furthermore, by requiring that a statute’s clarity be
determined on its face, not based on legislative history, lawyers would
be able to make an ex ante determination as to whether or not recourse
to legislative history will be required.  In addition, imposing strict limits
on the clarity of legislative history would signal to lawyers what sort of
statements should be examined.  As a result, lawyers would know what
materials of legislative history to look at, and how to weigh such mate-
rial in light of their clarity.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is much to be said for the fact that methods of statutory
interpretation do not have stare decisis effect in American courts.
Despite the sentiments of some Supreme Court justices, such as Justice
Scalia,169 it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would ever decide that
judges should never be allowed to consult legislative history.  This is
particularly true in light of the fact that the British courts made the
move to officially allow recourse to legislative history two decades ago.
Rather than argue about whether or not to consult legislative history at
all, one should discuss conditions limiting when such consultation
should be allowed.170 Though this would not appease Justice Scalia, it
would certainly help assuage the more vigorous concerns he has voiced
about the use of legislative history in the recent cases discussed above.
While the use of legislative history for statutory interpretation will
always remain controversial, experience in both British and American
courts shows that it is desirable to center the debate around when courts
should be able to consult legislative history, not whether they should be
allowed to do so in the first place.
Future research in this area should consider what conditions would
satisfy the concerns regarding the use of legislative history in courts. If
conditions were to be laid down by the Supreme Court, a further con-
sideration would be whether state courts could be bound by such condi-
tions regarding the use of legislative history, or whether such conditions
would only be binding on federal courts.  If Congress set such condi-
tions, one would further have to consider whether they would have the
ability to bind state courts.
168. See Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 254 (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. Id.
170. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 60 (“[R]ecent debate on the Supreme Court
between legislative history advocates and skeptics has generally been cast in an all-or-
nothing form.”).
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